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In this study, we investigate whether referrals from employers’ business and professional 
contacts matter in the hiring process. Additionally, we examine whether the effect of this type 
of informal recruitment varies depending on: (1) the signaling role of education during the 
hiring process, and (2) applicants’ level of education. Based on a combination of a factorial 
survey and an experimental design with a sample of employers in England, we measure the 
effect of referrals on employers’ hiring assessments. We find only weak evidence that 
referred applicants are considered more trainable than otherwise identical applicants that do 
not have a tie with the employer. More detailed analyses show that referrals do matter for 
employers who consider education a noisy signal, in line with the argument that informal 
recruitment can represent a strategy for employers to compensate for poor signaling. 
Referrals are especially beneficial for highly educated applicants, probably a sign that 
employers need some guarantee against possible wage or turnover costs.  
 













Networks of interpersonal ties are often described as conduits for the flow of high-quality 
information. In particular, their role in fostering labor market opportunities has been 
addressed by sociological studies on the importance of social contacts in the job search (De 
Graaf and Flap 1988, Granovetter 1995, Lin 1999, Erikson 2001, Flap and Boxman 2001, 
Kmec and Trimble 2009). From a job-seeker’s perspective, obtaining information from 
networks of interpersonal ties1 (i.e. friends, relatives, colleagues, or acquaintances) is known 
as informal job search. From an employer’s perspective, it is known as informal recruitment.  
Informal recruitment methods and informal job search activities have in common the fact that 
a tie conveys in-depth information about job applicants and job opportunities, respectively. 
However, the literature on the role of ties in the labor market has mainly considered the 
supply side of job matching, i.e. job-seekers, with a focus on their use of networks during the 
job search. Marsden and Gorman (2001) stress that interpersonal ties can also play a role in 
the recruitment process: specifically, employers may recruit via referrals by publicizing job 
openings among incumbent employees or business and professional contacts and asking them 
to recommend qualified applicants. Employers’ reliance on referrals from incumbent 
employees during the recruitment process has been investigated in a number of studies which 
use detailed personnel records to measure the chances of referred job applicants’ success at 
each, consecutive stage of the hiring process (Fernandez et al. 2000, Petersen et al. 2000). 
Findings from these studies confirm that referrals from incumbent employees increase the 
chances of being invited for a job interview and lead to higher job offer rates compared to 
non-referred applicants.  
We aim to contribute to this literature by examining an important type of referral that has 
been under-researched, namely business and professional contacts of the employer. These are 
network contacts that do not originate in the firm. They can be established and ‘mobilized’ in 
gatherings of professional and branch organizations, conferences, online networks, but also in 
informal settings, for instance while playing golf or at a charity gathering. A few studies 
emphasize the importance and frequency of this type of recruitment (Petersen et al. 2000, 
Behrenz 2001, Marsden 2001, Pinkston 2012). In addition, the increasing impact of on-line 
networks, such as LinkedIn, connecting business and professional contacts raises the issue as 
to what is happening in the external networking world. Hence, our first research question 
addresses whether referrals from business and professional contacts matter for employers’ 
hiring behavior. Theoretically, we provide various arguments as to why these contacts might 
matter, by referring to a set of mechanisms used in previous seminal works of Fernandez and 
others (e.g. Fernandez et al. 2000, Neckerman and Fernandez 2003, Fernandez and Galperin 
2014) that studied referrals from incumbent employees from the perspective of employers. 
Empirically, we apply a combination of a factorial survey with an experimental design, 
allowing for a proper assessment of the effect of employers’ business contacts on their hiring 
decisions.  
                                                          
1 In this paper, we will use the terms interpersonal ties and social contacts interchangeably. 
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From a methodological point of view, our study speaks directly to both Mouw’s (2006) and 
Fernandez and Galperin’s (2014) recent work on how to address issues of endogeneity when 
studying the role of ties in the labor market with non-experimental data: namely, well-
connected individuals may differ from individuals with few or no labor market ties on a 
number of unobserved characteristics that affect both their likelihood to be part of a network 
and their labor market outcomes. If this were the case, the effect of social ties would be 
spurious due to social homophily. We address this selection bias by relying on a factorial 
survey and an experimental manipulation, in line with Mouw’s (2006: 81) call for “fairly 
simple methods combined with innovative use of quasi-experimental data”. A factorial 
survey is a regression-based technique to analyze how respondents evaluate hypothetical 
objects, profiles or situations that are described on vignettes (Rossi and Anderson 1982, Jasso 
2006, Wallander 2009). The method is well-suited to study complex decision-making 
processes such as hiring. This is because, compared to other methods, in factorial surveys 
various attributes are varied simultaneously, limiting the risk of socially desirable answers 
(Wallander 2009, Mutz 2011). 
In our study, we asked employers to rate a number of vignettes describing hypothetical job 
applicants that randomly varied along certain characteristics (e.g. gender, qualifications, 
previous work experience). The ratings reflect employers’ perception about the likelihood 
that: they would hire the applicants; and the applicants, if hired, would be easy to train and fit 
with the corporate culture of the organization. The experimental manipulation allowed us to 
collect, for each employer, ratings of the same applicants under two conditions: when 
referred and when non-referred by business and professional contacts of the employer. By 
treating the latter as the counterfactual for how applicants would be assessed if not referred, 
we are able to cope with the fundamental challenge, stressed by Mouw (2003; 2006), of 
comparing referred applicants with otherwise identical applicants who cannot rely on a tie 
with the employer. Our focus on the demand side of the labor market also adds to an 
emerging literature pioneered by Fernandez and Galperin (2014) that looks at the causal 
effect of referrals from the employers’ perspective. Compared to their study, which analyzed 
referrals from incumbents based on data on repeated applications in a single firm in the 
United States, ours has the advantage that it isolates the effect of referrals for applicants that 
apply for the same job opening and are screened by the same organizational agent. In 
addition, we focus on a different type of tie: that between the employer and a business or 
professional contact. 
The contribution of our study goes a step further by linking this type of informal recruitment 
to the signaling role of education during the hiring process. Previous studies have shown that 
employers, despite having school-based indicators of human capital (e.g. grades, transcripts), 
are less inclined to use this information during the hiring process unless it is obtained from 
trusted channels, such as their own workers or other long-term social networks (Miller and 
Rosenbaum 1997, Brinton and Kariya 1998, Rosenbaum et al. 1999). Thus, these studies 
relate employers’ use of networks in recruitment to the signaling role of education: if 
education does not convey clear or credible information (i.e. education is a noisy signal for 
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employers), one would expect employers to rely more heavily on their social contacts. 
Research on recruitment also suggests that information obtained from informal recruitment 
channels should be even more important when formal institutions such as the education 
system fail to send clear signals to employers (Marsden 2001). We are not aware, however, of 
any study that empirically tests whether this is the case. It is thus an open question whether 
employers will rely more on their business and professional contacts when education is 
perceived as a poor signal. Moreover, it is also unknown whether employers rely on their 
contacts more frequently when an applicant’s educational qualification is high than when it is 
low. Given the higher uncertainty and the expected investments related to hiring applicants 
with higher levels of education (Flap and Boxman 2001), employers may find some form of 
guarantee in their ties with their business and professional contacts. 
Our study is based on unique survey data of employers’ hiring behavior in England. England 
is a typical case of a weakly standardized education system: multiple, somewhat overlapping 
qualification frameworks exist, and standards with regard to the content of curricula and the 
organization of teacher training are lacking (Scherer 2005). As a result, one can expect 
variation in the way English employers perceive the signaling role of education. Our data 
allows us to test whether English employers who perceive education as a noisy signal, use 
informal recruitment channels as a compensatory strategy.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Ties in the labor market: informal recruitment 
 
The extensive literature on the use of interpersonal ties has made a substantial contribution to 
our understanding of the workings of the labor market. Though not as exhaustive as the 
informal job search literature,2 the extent to which employers engage in informal recruitment 
when filling vacancies, and their preference for informal over formal channels, has attracted 
the attention of scholars from both sociology (Boxman et al. 1991, Erikson 2001, Marsden 
2001, Marsden and Gomoran 2001, Gërxhani et al. 2013, Gërxhani and Koster forthcoming) 
and economics (Montgomery 1991, Behrenz 2001, Schram et al. 2010). Framed from the 
employers’ perspective, one has to consider the advantage that employers can gain from the 
use of information that is channeled through social networks (Montgomery 1991): what 
matters is whether and to what extent employers rely on social ties with incumbent 
employees or other business contacts while making hiring decisions.  
Employers’ reliance on referrals from their incumbent employees has been thoroughly 
studied (e.g. Fernandez et al. 2000, Petersen et al. 2000, Neckerman and Fernandez 2003). 
Other sources of referrals, i.e. employers’ own business and professional contacts, have 
received less attention. The few existing studies do however indicate that this type of referral 
may play an important role in employers’ recruitment and selection decisions. On the basis of 
                                                          
2 For some points of criticism on this literature, see Mouw (2003).  
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data from the National Organization Study, a representative employer survey in the United 
States, Marsden (2001) reports that business and professional contacts are a frequent source 
of recruitment in more than one fifth of surveyed establishments. Employers are more likely 
to rely on this type of interpersonal ties when recruiting for managerial, 
professionals/technical or sales/services positions than for semi-skilled or unskilled ones. 
This same finding is supported by an empirical study of Dutch organizations (Gërxhani and 
Koster forthcoming). Petersen et al. (2000), analyzing the personnel record of a high-tech 
firm in the United States, find that professional networks are one of the two main entry routes 
into the organization, used by 9.4 percent of applicants and 13.2 percent of those receiving a 
job offer. A Swedish study shows that references from former employers and personal 
contacts are among the most important sources of information for employers when choosing 
the person to be hired (Behrenz 2001). Pinkston (2012), using an employer survey conducted 
for the U.S. Department of Labor, reports that referrals from other employers provide 
respondents with more information than other recruitment channels. Once hired, referred 
employees tend to earn higher wages and to be more productive than non-referred ones. 
Moreover, the same study shows that the effects of referrals on the flow of information are 
substantial: on average, it takes employers almost one and a half years to learn as much about 
a non-referred employee as they know about an employee referred by an employer from 
another firm. 
Though important, these studies do not go in depth in examining why and when employers 
use their own business and professional contacts in deciding whom to hire.3 Studies focusing 
on referrals from incumbent employees, on the other hand, look more closely at the 
mechanisms underlying employers’ benefits from recruiting informally.4 In particular, 
Fernandez et al. (2000) distinguish between five distinct mechanisms. Thanks to network 
contacts of their incumbent employees, employers can tap into a pool of applicants that 
would not be reached otherwise (mechanism 1: applicant pool expansion). As the contacts 
making the referral are concerned about their reputation within the organization, they will 
tend to refer only qualified applicants (mechanism 2: reputation protection). Referrers, 
having survived previous screening processes, are a positively selected group and by putting 
in a good word for individuals who are alike will generate a qualified pool of applicants 
(mechanism 3: homophily). In addition, referrers can pass on information that is difficult to 
measure or not readily observable by the employer (e.g. about applicants’ soft skills, 
attitudes, work ethic) and at the same time provide applicants with inside knowledge about 
the job and the workplace (mechanism 4: informational advantages). Referrals from 
incumbent employees can yield post-hire advantages, as established relationships between 
                                                          
3 Mencken and Winfield (1998) argue that employers consider ‘quality of applicants’ as the main advantage of 
informal recruitment via business or professional contacts, especially in small and private sector organisations. 
However, the reason why business and professional contacts of the employer refer applicants of such quality is 
left undiscussed. 
4 Referrals from incumbent employees have also been studied in the personnel selection literature. Two 
mechanisms are usually discussed as to why referrals are associated with better pre- and post-hire outcomes: the 
realism hypothesis and the individual difference hypothesis (see Breaugh 2012 for more details). Also in this 
literature, however, the proposed mechanisms are not related to other types of referrals, e.g. referrals from 
business and professional contacts of the employer. 
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referrers and referred on the one hand, and better knowledge of both the job content and of 
the job setting on the other hand, can ease the transition into a new workplace (mechanism 5: 
social enrichment). In more recent work, Fernandez and Galperin (2014) discuss an 
additional mechanism that may explain employers’ use of referrals, namely the fact that the 
refereed are due an extra look out of courtesy to the referring contact (mechanism 6: 
courtesy).  
These same mechanisms can also underlie employers’ decision to hire referrals from their 
business and professional contacts. Though it is not our goal to test these mechanisms, we 
discuss them here in order to provide theoretical explanations as to why and how employers´ 
professional networks would possibly matter. Four of these mechanisms are relevant to our 
theoretical analysis.5 Employers expect business and professional contacts to refer qualified 
applicants who are suitable for the job and may thus be more easily trainable, as the contacts 
making the referrals are concerned about their reputation in a shared business environment 
and will in turn be reciprocated (reputation protection) (Gërxhani et al. 2013). An applicant 
referred to an employer by the latter’s business and professional contacts will likely be more 
similar to both the contact making the referral and to the employer than non-referred 
applicants. This similarity may be rewarded as it may indicate a better compatibility with the 
new organization (homophily) (Fairchild and Robinson 2004, Fernandez and Galperin 2014). 
Applicants that have been referred by business and professional contacts of the employer may 
also signal a “capacity to invest in and draw on interpersonal social capital, and thereby to 
succeed in the position in question” (Marsden 2001: 108). Erickson (2001) makes a similar 
argument: job applicants with access to a large and varied network of contacts can signal to 
employers the possibility to exploit these resources, once hired. These contacts may be 
helpful even in the post-hire phase, as they can provide mentoring or information on tacit 
aspects of the job, and aid newcomers in the organizational socialization process, just as in 
the case of referrals from incumbents. Therefore, by choosing to hire applicants recruited via 
this type of referrals, employers may anticipate the attainment of positive post-hire outcomes 
(e.g. social enrichment). Finally, employers may consider hiring a referred applicant simply 
out of courtesy to the employers’ business and professional contact making the referral 
(courtesy).  
 
This discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
                                                          
5 The mechanisms of applicant pool expansion and informational advantages will not be discussed further for 
the following reasons. Empirically, we use a factorial survey in which, by design, applicant pools are 
predetermined. In other words, our focus lies in the advantages that employers derive from their interpersonal 
ties when the applicant pool to be hired from is held constant. The mechanism of informational advantages 
cannot be at work because in our design employers do not receive any additional information from the contact: 
they are simply told that the applicants have been referred by the contact. In addition, such a mechanism works 
under the assumption that the information given by a business and professional contact is positive. This 
information can however be negative as well (see Neckerman and Fernandez 2003 for a discussion of this issue 
in relation to referrals from incumbent employees). We are thankful to Roberto Fernandez for pointing this out 




Hypothesis 1a: Applicants referred by business and professional contacts of a 
prospective employer are more likely to be hired than non-referred applicants. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Applicants referred by business and professional contacts of a 
prospective employer are more easily trainable than non-referred applicants. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Applicants referred by business and professional contacts of a 
prospective employer fit better in their new working environment than non-referred 
applicants. 
 
While we cannot adjudicate between the mechanisms underlying these hypotheses, we can 
show whether referrals matter in the hiring process even when two possible mechanisms 
identified in earlier studies are ruled out by design (applicant pool expansion, informational 
advantages). Positive effects of referrals on the three hiring-related outcomes would suggest 
that referrals matter also when employers’ business and professional contacts do not provide 
them with an expanded pool of applicants, or with any additional information on the 
applicants. A lack of evidence for a referral effect could either mean that business referrals do 
not matter in the context under study, or that the mechanisms at work are not the ones we are 
able to capture with our design.  
 
2.2. Informal recruitment and the screening of educational qualifications 
 
Signaling theory (Spence 1974) argues that employers, when hiring, have very little 
information about the productivity and commitment of prospective employees. In order to 
make their hiring decisions, employers rely on signals from the education system (e.g. type of 
qualifications, grades, coursework, or duration of studies). However, some authors 
(Rosenbaum et al. 1990, Miller and Rosenbaum 1997, Brinton and Kariya 1998) have 
nuanced this theory with the observation that signals are trusted by employers only if 
embedded in a context of on-going social or institutional relationships. On the basis of 
interviews with 51 employers in Chicago and its western suburbs, Miller and Rosenbaum 
(1997: 499) argue that “social infrastructure not only is the means by which information is 
conveyed but also influences the ways in which employers view information and particularly 
whether they trust it”. Despite employers’ stated needs for academic skills, and the fact that 
schools could provide information about school leavers’ academic performance (e.g. grades, 
school transcripts, or teacher recommendations), employers in this study rarely based their 
hiring decisions on information received from schools and explicitly mentioned that they did 
not consider it trustworthy. To cope with the problem of mistrust, employers depended on 
information that is “conveyed within a social context of an on-going relationship” (p. 500) 
and relied on recruiting networks. These networks can be more or less institutionalized. In 
some countries, like Germany and Japan, institutional linkages between schools and 
employers are well-developed and information received from schools is perceived as reliable 
and highly regarded. Elsewhere, like in the United States or in the United Kingdom, long-
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term ties between teachers and employers may improve the role of grades or school 
transcripts as signals (Rosenbaum et al. 1990). 
As argued above (c.f. 2.1), interpersonal ties can provide advantages that may improve 
signaling during the hiring process. This is particularly relevant since a hiring process 
involves first a recruitment phase in which various recruitment channels are used to attract 
applicants, and then a screening phase where a hiring decision is made based on a ranking of 
various criteria like education, work experience, etc. (Barron and Bishop 1986). When these 
criteria are perceived as insufficient, unclear or unreliable, social contacts used through 
informal recruitment may play a crucial role, ensuring that employers can rely on the 
information available during the screening phase.  
In a relatively more recent study, Jackson et al. (2005) discuss the role of educational 
qualifications as screening criteria from the employers’ perspective. The main functions that 
employers associate with education involve ‘certifying’ acquired knowledge and ‘signaling’ 
less readily or non-observable characteristics of an applicant like motivation, trainability, 
compatibility with the organization, etc. Based on content analysis of job newspaper 
advertisements in England, their study shows that both functions are decreasing in value in 
the eyes of employers.  Important for our study, they also observe that “if qualifications do 
thus decline in value as a signal, an incentive is created for employers to look for alternative, 
or at all events supplementary signals” (p. 12). We argue here that one way through which 
employers can compensate for poor or decreasing education signaling is by turning to their 
own business and professional contacts. This expectation is consistent with the argument of 
Fernandez et al. (2000: 1338) that “if the characteristics being screened for are easy to 
measure, then there is no independent benefit to the company in preferring referrals once 
recruiters apply their screen”. On the other hand, if the characteristics being screened for are 
noisy signals, then employers are more likely to get some additional benefit from preferring 
referrals. This argument holds under the condition that the information passed on through 
social contacts is trustworthy, which can be expected as the contacts making the referrals 
want to protect their reputation. In other words, referrals provide employers with the 
additional guarantee that the noisy signals of educational qualifications can be trusted. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The effect of referrals on applicants’ likelihood to be hired is larger for 
employers who perceive education to be a noisy signal.  
Hypothesis 2b: The effect of referrals on the likelihood that the applicants are 
considered easy to train is larger for employers who perceive education to be a noisy 
signal.  
Hypothesis 2c: The effect of referrals on the likelihood that applicants are considered 
a good fit with the corporate environment is larger for employers who perceive 
education to be a noisy signal. 
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Finally, the effect of referrals could also vary depending on whether an applicant’s level of 
educational qualification is high or low. Since higher levels of education imply higher levels 
of formal qualifications an applicant has acquired, employers may be more inclined to rely on 
their contacts to check upon such qualifications, than in the case of applicants with lower 
levels of education. Hiring highly educated individuals involves more uncertainty and risk, as 
higher levels of formal qualifications are typically rewarded more, both intrinsically (e.g. 
autonomy, participation in decision-making) and extrinsically (e.g. pay-for-performance 
schemes, career opportunities) by employers (Gallie et al. 2012). In addition, highly educated 
individuals are the ones that once being hired will typically receive training opportunities and 
follow career tracks (Flap and Boxman 2001). Given these expected investments, employers 
would prefer to have some sort of insurance or guarantee that the highly educated applicants 
will remain in the organization. The employers’ interpersonal ties with their business and 
professional contacts could be seen as such. This yields the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of referrals on an applicant’s likelihood to be hired increases 
with higher levels of education. 6 
 
3. Design, data and method  
3.1. Counterfactual hiring decisions 
 
An important contribution of our study is its effort to isolate the role of referrals on 
employers’ hiring decisions. In a critical review of the literature on the role of social ties in 
the labor market, Mouw (2003) warns researchers against the risk of confounding the effect 
of social capital with spurious correlations due to the non-random acquisition of friendship 
ties. He proposes a test to assess the causal effect of networks (i.e. the information that social 
ties can provide and that job-seekers are able to access in order to find a job) on labor market 
outcomes. If contacts really matter, “then well-connected individuals should be more likely to 
obtain their job through contacts than otherwise identical individuals who are not well-
connected” (Mouw 2003: 873). A comparison between networked job-seekers and otherwise 
identical individuals who cannot access their contacts (e.g. who during their search cannot 
obtain information about available jobs from friends, relatives or other acquaintances) implies 
a counterfactual comparison.  
In a similar vein, but from the perspective of employers, Fernandez and Galperin (2014) 
emphasize the importance of discussing counterfactual hiring decisions of firms that recruit 
via networks. They observe that “simply put, for the causal effect to be identified, the 
analysis needs to address what the hiring outcome would have been if not for the firm’s use 
of the network in recruiting” (p. 449). In studies based on personnel records, employers’ 
                                                          
6 Note that we only focus on the hiring propensity, as this is the only variable that has direct implication on 
turnover and replacement costs.  
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higher likelihood to hire referrals could partly be confounded with the role of other factors 
that remain unobservable to the researcher, but are known to the employer when making the 
hiring decision. To the extent that these factors are correlated with both the likelihood of the 
applicants to be part of a network and with applicants’ likelihood to be hired, then the 
network effect would be spurious.  
For our research interests, the core issue is determining what employers’ assessments would 
be if job applicants were not referred by a business and professional contact. Previous studies 
have applied laboratory experiments (with students) to control for the type of information 
about prospective employees that is available to the employer (Schram et al. 2010, Gërxhani 
et al. 2013). Alternatively, Pinkston (2012) compared pairs of individuals employed in the 
same firm for the same job but differing in their referral status, thus differencing out job- and 
firm-specific characteristics. In our study, we follow the suggestion of Fernandez and 
Galperin (2012) and compare employers’ assessments of job applicants that are not referred, 
to the assessments that the same applicants would receive if they were referred by employers’ 
professional and business contacts. In order to do so, we rely on a factorial survey carried out 
with a sample of human resource professionals. Compared to other studies, the main 
advantage of our method is the possibility to compare assessments made by the same 
employer for the same type of job, before and after the recruitment source is disclosed (on the 
contrary, personnel records usually pool together data on employees that have been assessed 
by different recruiters at several points in time, and for jobs that are often not comparable). 
Using this method, we test whether applicants receive better assessments if referred by 
business and professional contacts of the employer, with a particular focus on: (i) the role of 
referrals for employers who do not consider education a signal of applicants’ trainability and 
corporate fit; and (ii) the role of referrals for applicants with different levels of educational 
qualifications. 
 
3.2. Data and method 
 
Respondents 
Our study is based on a simulation of a hiring process with a sample of employers 
(represented by human resource professionals) in the Information, Communication and 
Technology (henceforth: ICT) sector in England. The data collection took place between May 
and November 2012, as part of a broader project on job matching and the role of 
qualifications in the hiring process.7 Respondents were employed in companies affiliated with 
either of the two ICT trade associations operating in England (UKITA, the trade association 
for ICT small and medium-sized enterprises, and INTELLECT, the trade association for the 
technology industry), and randomly sampled from the associations’ membership records. 
They were contacted by phone or email and invited to take part in an online survey.  
                                                          
7 The ICT sector was of substantial interest for the broader project (see Di Stasio 2013 for a more detailed 
discussion). We address the issue of the generalizability of our findings in the conclusions. 
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In total, 172 organizations were targeted, and 34 human resource professionals participated in 
the survey, yielding a 20 percent response rate, consistent with other studies targeting 
employers (e.g. Huselid 1995; for a meta-analysis see Baruch and Holtom 2008). All 
respondents evaluated a set of vignettes describing hypothetical profiles of job applicants, 
using a web-based factorial survey. 22 of these professionals were also asked to rate an 
additional set of vignettes, where information on the informal recruitment channel was 
provided (as explained in detail below). The socio-demographic characteristics of these 
respondents and of their organizations are summarized in Table 1. Nearly all respondents are 
highly educated, and there is a balanced representation across genders. Their age ranged 
between 25 and over 55. The majority of respondents have at least three years of experience 
in personnel selection, confirming that we targeted decision-makers with some established 
expertise in making hiring decisions. Our sample included both private and public sector 
organizations, and guaranteed that both large organizations and organizations of small or 
medium size were covered. In Table 1, we also compare the size of organizations in our 
sample with the size of all targeted organizations, thus taking non-respondents into account. 
As shown in the table, large organizations are well-represented in our sample whereas small 
organizations (with less than 50 employees) were somewhat more likely to participate in the 
study than medium-sized organizations (with more than 50 employees).8 Finally, almost 80 
percent of our respondents regularly solicit referrals from business and professional contacts 
while recruiting, suggesting that this type of referrals is a frequent source of bringing in new 
recruits. This assures us that the employers’ task to rate referred versus non- referred 
applicants in the simulation is close to real organizational practices. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Factorial survey 
We simulated a hiring process using a web-based factorial survey (Rossi and Anderson 1982, 
Jasso 2006, Wallander 2009), a technique widely applied in research on deviant behavior and 
on justice evaluations, but less known in labor market sociology. Employers rated a series of 
vignettes showing hypothetical descriptions of job applicants, which had been created 
through a random combination of a few characteristics of interest. These characteristics were: 
gender of the applicant, previous work experience, participation in an internship at the 
                                                          
8 When sampling organizations, we tried to ensure an adequate coverage of small, medium-sized and large 
organizations. However, in some cases, the number of employees reported by the respondent did not correspond 
to the number of employees mentioned in the membership records from which the organizations were sampled. 
This may explain the slight under-representation of medium-sized organizations in our sample. The 
representativeness of our sample can also be assessed based on a comparison with Eurostat data on business 
demographics in computer programming, consultancy and related activities (NACE code 62) in the United 
Kingdom (data refer to the year 2010 and were not available for England alone). When considering 
organizations with more than 10 employees, 30 percent of employees are found in small organizations, 26 
percent in medium-sized organizations, and 44 percent in large organizations, largely comparable with the 
distributions of organizations in our sample.  
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employer’s firm, level of education, field of study, study duration, grade point average, extra-
curricular activities (see Appendix A). We measured employers’ ratings on a scale from 0 to 
100, in terms of agreement with the following three statements: i) it is likely that I will hire 
the applicant; ii) it is likely that the applicant, if hired, will be easy to train; iii) it is likely that 
the applicant, if hired, would fit well with the corporate culture of my organization. Thus, our 
first dependent variable measures employers’ hiring propensity, whereas the second and third 
ones capture the trainability and fit with the organization, respectively. These latter aspects 
are commonly discussed among the expected benefits of recruiting informally (Fernandez et 
al. 2000, Marsden and Gorman 2001). At the end of the hiring simulation, employers filled 
out a questionnaire about their recruitment and selection practices, and the characteristics of 
their organization. Among the aspects addressed in the questionnaire, employers were asked 
to specify the recruitment channels regularly activated by their organization when reaching 
out to potential job applicants. A few questions dealt with the role of education as a signal. 
For example, employers were asked to indicate whether or not they considered education a 
signal of trainability, or of fit with the corporate environment. 
The hiring simulation was divided into two parts. In the first part (time1), we asked 
employers to rate 18 hypothetical profiles of job applicants, shown in random order (first 
rating task). We then told them to give a closer look at a shortlist of the five best-rated 
profiles and to rank them in order of preference in view of a job interview (first ranking task). 
In a further step, additional information about applicants’ communication and networking 
skills was added to the same vignettes to simulate a job interview. Employers re-ranked these 
profiles (second ranking task). After all these steps, employers were told that the five 
shortlisted applicants were no longer available and the experimental manipulation started 
(time2). In this second part of the simulation, respondents were shown five additional 
applicants who had been referred by one of their business and professional contacts and rated 
them on our three dependent variables of interest (second rating task). Unbeknownst to 
employers, these additional profiles were identical to five of the profiles already rated in the 
first part of the simulation, except for their referral status. The instructions given to 
respondents are reported in appendix B. 9 Thus, the only difference between the first and the 
second sets of ratings is that, for the latter, the recruitment source was known. Given that for 
the first set the recruitment source was not yet revealed, these ratings can be treated as 
baseline counterfactuals of what the hiring decision would have been in the absence of 
referral.  
                                                          
9 Note that between the time employers rated the five ‘non-referred’ profiles in the first part and the time they 
rated the same ‘referred’ profiles in the second part, employers had various other evaluation steps. Moreover, 
additional information on applicants’ skills were provided as a filler. For this reason, we believe it is very 
unlikely that employers were able to precisely recall what the vignettes introduced in random order during the 
rating tasks looked like. We can however not exclude the possibility that they understood the experimental 
manipulation. In that case, we would expect them to rate referrals and non-referrals similarly, implying an 
underestimated referral effect. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this latter observation. It is likely 
that employers who did not understand the manipulation may still be wary of revealing their preferences for 
referrals due to social desirability bias (as network-based hiring may be considered a sort of preferential 
treatment). Even in this case, our estimates for the referral effect would be conservative. 
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For the empirical analysis, we focus only on the subset of vignettes, five per employer, that 
received multiple ratings. Our design can be considered a particular application of a multiple 
segment factorial vignette design (Ganong and Coleman 2006), in which the description 
contained in a vignette develops over multiple segments. The only difference in our design is 
that respondents were told that they were dealing with different applicants at time2, and the 
new information added to the vignettes (referral status) was held constant across employers. 
Therefore, referral status is, by design, uncorrelated with the vignette characteristics. Our 
main focus is on the sign and significance of the coefficient for referral status, and on 
whether this effect varies depending on: (i) the signaling role of education; and (ii) an 
applicant’s level of education. The characteristics of (referred) applicants, and descriptive 
statistics of the ratings, are reported in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Estimation method 
To test our hypotheses 1a-1c, we compare employers’ ratings before the recruitment method 
was revealed, with the ratings given after knowing that one of their business or professional 
contacts had made a referral. As ratings have been collected before and after the referral 
source was disclosed, a paired t-test would give us an unbiased measure of the difference in 
ratings that is due to referrals, averaged across respondents. However, the fact that multiple 
vignettes were rated by the same employer would bias the standard errors downwards, if the 
nesting structure of the data were not properly accounted for. Thus, we reshaped our dataset 
into a long format. Referral status is captured by a dummy variable taking the value of 0 at 
time1 and value of 1 at time2, after information about informal recruitment is disclosed. We 
regressed ratings on referral status, using fixed effects for employers to obtain correct 
standard errors. As the dependent variables were right-skewed, we took their square root to 
obtain more reliable estimates. We focus on the coefficient for referral status, which 
represents the change in ratings that occurs after the recruitment source has been revealed.  
With this model, we also implicitly control for any characteristic of the employers or their 
organizations that may affect the ratings. The model relies exclusively on within-employer 
variability of the ratings and of covariates in the estimation of the regression coefficients. Our 
dependent variables measure employers’ ratings of the likelihood that: (1) they would hire the 
job applicant; (2) the applicant, if hired, would be easily trainable; and (3) the applicant, if 
hired, would fit well in the new working environment. Thus, for each of the three dependent 
variables, we fit three models. The first model (M1) tests hypotheses 1a-1c by reporting the 
effect of applicants’ referral status, without any additional control as referral status was an 
exogenous variable in our design. The second model (M2) tests hypotheses 2a-2c by adding 
the interaction term between referral status and employers’ views about the signaling role of 
education. The latter is captured by two dummy variables, which were coded 1 if the 
employer mentioned in the survey that education is a signal of, respectively, trainability or fit 
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with the corporate environment (i.e. good signal), and 0 otherwise (i.e. poor signal). Finally, 
the third model (M3) tests hypothesis 3 by adding an interaction term between referral status 
and an applicant’s level of education.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
Table 3 shows the results of several linear regression models, with fixed effects for 
employers. Results are presented in separate panels for each of the three dependent variables. 
As reported in the first model (M1) in all three panels, once employers know that applicants 
have been referred, they tend to give more positive ratings: the average difference in ratings 
that is due to referrals is positive for all three dependent variables. Knowing that the 
applicants have been referred by a business and professional contact improves employers’ 
hiring propensity and expectations regarding future trainability and corporate fit. As referral 
status was by design uncorrelated with the vignette characteristics, the higher ratings obtained 
by referred applicants cannot be due to unobserved differences in applicants’ likelihood to be 
part of an employer’s network. By ruling out this possibility, we can be sure that the effect of 
referrals is not spurious, as discussed in Fernandez and Galperin (2014) for employers and in 
Mouw (2003) for employees. However, though differences in ratings are in the expected 
direction for all three measurements, they are only statistically significant at p<0.1 (95% C.I. 
-0.029, 0.554) for the measure of trainability, and the effect size is rather small. These 
findings provide only modest support for hypothesis 1b, but no support for hypotheses 1a and 
1c.  
It is important to emphasize that our design ruled out some of the mechanisms through which 
referrals may exert their effect in the labor market. To the extent that referrals matter for their 
role in expanding the pool of applicants or of bringing tangible informational advantages to 
employers, we were not able to capture these processes with our hiring simulation. We also 
believe that the difference in ratings due to the referral status may be an underestimation of 
the true effect of referrals for two reasons. First, in our study employers were simply 
informed that the applicant had been referred by one of their business and professional 
contacts, without specifying which kind of relationship existed between the applicant and the 
common contact (e.g. whether the contact was a former employer of the applicant, or had 
screened the applicant before). The effect of referrals might have been higher if employers 
knew that the contact making the referral had the opportunity in the past to observe the 
performance of the applicant, as demonstrated by Antoninis (2006) and Gërxhani et al. 
(2013) for the relationship between referrals and wages. The second reason has to do with our 
factorial survey design. Since referrals were hypothetical, it is likely that they weigh less in 
affecting employers’ ratings than if referrals were ‘real’ and thus more accountable.10 
Therefore, we consider our results as conservative estimates of the effect of referrals on the 
three dependent variables.  
                                                          




TABLE 3 HERE 
 
We now turn to examine the effect of referrals in relation to the signaling role of educational 
qualifications. In the second models (M2) of Table 3, we tested whether the referral effect is 
larger for those employers who consider education a poor signal by introducing an interaction 
effect between referral status and the variables measuring employers’ views about the role of 
education as a signal of, respectively, trainability and fit with the corporate environment. The 
coefficient for referral status in M2T (Panel 1) represents the effect of referrals for those 
employers who consider education a poor signal of trainability and is statistically significant 
(0.444 at p<0.05; C.I. 0.007, 0.882). Similarly, the effect of referrals on the trainability 
ratings (M2 in Panel 2) is larger and significant for employers who do not consider education 
a signal of trainability (0.516, at p<0.01; 95% C.I. 0.140, 0.892). The estimates for the 
interaction terms suggest that only when applicants’ trainability cannot be discerned from 
educational qualifications employers tend to rely on referrals from their business and 
professional contacts. Finally, the interaction effect for the ratings of corporate fit (M2 in 
Panel 3), though in the expected direction, does not reach conventional levels of significance. 
Model M2F in Panel 1 also suggests that the effect of referrals on hiring propensity does not 
vary depending on whether employers consider education a signal of fit with the corporate 
environment.11 These findings support hypotheses 2a (partly) and 2b, but not hypothesis 2c. 
To test hypothesis 3, we interacted referral status with applicants’ level of education. The 
third model (M3 in Panel 1) of Table 3 shows that when applicants are referred, there is a 
stronger differentiation in ratings across educational levels, suggesting that the role of 
employers’ business and professional contacts varies depending on an applicant’s level of 
education. In particular, the effect of referrals is larger for higher levels of education. 
Hypothesis 3 is thus supported.  
It is worth noting that the referral effect is the strongest for applicants that have followed a 
university master’s program, whereas for applicants with non-tertiary education (A-level) the 
effect of referrals is even negative. Ratings for applicants with non-tertiary education 
decrease after the informal recruitment source is disclosed, though the effect is not 
statistically significant. It appears that the presence of referrals starts to pay off at a certain 
level of formal qualifications. We interpret our findings based on the mechanism of 
homophily described earlier in the paper.12 Since most employers in our sample have a 
tertiary degree (c.f. Table 2), according to the homophily argument they would expect 
referred applicants to have an educational level similar to them and their contacts. If the 
                                                          
11 We can speculate that fit is less important in jobs of a rather technical nature such as the ones under study 
here; indeed, a very low number of employers mentioned that they consider education a signal of fit with the 
corporate culture when hiring for ICT jobs. 
12 Again, we do not test whether this mechanism is at play, as it is beyond the goal of our study. We simply draw 
on our theoretical discussion to better understand our empirical results.   
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educational level is lower, but applicants are still referred, it may make employers suspicious 
on whether they can rely on the referrals. As a result, employers ´punish´ non-tertiary 
applicants by giving them more negative ratings if referred.  
Employers seem to ´reward´ the master-level applicants the most. Given that the entry 
requirement for the type of jobs we study here is a bachelor degree (as reported by employers 
themselves in the accompanying questionnaire), a priori it seems unnecessary to value a 
master degree more than a bachelor degree, as master-level applicants would be overeducated 
for the job at hand. To hire “atypically highly credentialed candidates”, employers need some 
insurance against the risk that the overeducated applicants may leave the organization (Bills 
1992). When master-level applicants are referred, employers´ interpersonal ties seem to 
provide this guarantee. 
Before concluding, two caveats related to order and carryover effects need to be addressed. 
Order effects may occur to the extent that employers’ responses were affected by the 
sequencing of the information. In our design, in order to elicit employers’ ratings after the 
recruitment source was disclosed, we told employers that the job applicants they had 
shortlisted had found other jobs in the meantime.13 This setup may have given employers the 
impression that they were operating in a tight labor market, which could trigger different 
responses to the use of particular types of recruitment channels (e.g. Henkens et al. 2005). In 
our analysis, we could not test whether employers’ decisions were influenced by perceptions 
of labor market tightness. However, to provide a robustness check for our results, we 
analyzed ratings collected from a control group of 12 additional employers (the remaining 
respondents from the 34 who initially accepted to take part in the study). The first stage of the 
vignette study was identical to the one previously discussed. After a shortlist of applicants 
was created, employers in the control group were told that the shortlisted ones withdrew their 
applications as they had found another job in the meantime. As an alternative, employers 
could re-screen the remaining five best-rated applicants from the initial pool. Importantly, 
these re-screened applicants were not recruited via referrals. Table 4 reports a comparison of 
ratings at time1 and time2 for employers in the control group. If labor market tightness would 
play a role, one would expect employers’ second ratings to be higher: in the absence of 
additional applicants to screen, employers are likely to reconsider the rated applicants as the 
available pool in the labor market is limited. This was not the case: for all three dependent 
variables, ratings at time2 were significantly lower. The fact that employers’ behavior was 
the opposite in the presence of referrals (cf. models M1 of Table 3) excludes the possibility 
that the reported difference in ratings that we attributed to referrals is, instead, related to 
perceived labor market tightness.  
 
                                                          
13 This strategy was necessary in order to gather employers’ ratings about referred applicants. Admittedly, a 
better alternative would be to mention the recruitment channel among the characteristics that are listed in the 
vignettes. However, our study is part of a broader survey that was originally designed for other purposes and it 
was not possible to include the recruitment channel in the description of the profiles. 
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TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Carryover effects are also likely as in our study we assumed stability of ratings across 
vignettes that were rated by the same employer. In other words, we assumed that employers 
would give the same rating as long as the characteristics of the applicant remained identical, 
regardless of the applicants that had already been rated during the rest of the simulation. 
Following Hainmueller et al. (2013), we tested the plausibility of this assumption using only 
the first vignette that was shown to respondents after the experimental manipulation. Our 




This study makes a threefold contribution to sociological research on the importance of ties in 
the labor market. First, our focus on employers and in particular on their business and 
professional contacts adds to a body of literature that has either primarily concentrated on 
supply-side explanations or, when considering the demand-side, it has mainly focused on the 
social contacts of incumbent employees. Second, by combining the factorial survey with an 
experimental manipulation we created counterfactual hiring decisions in order to compare 
how identical job applicants are perceived in the presence or absence of referrals from 
employers’ business and professional contacts. In so doing, we provide a test of the effect of 
social contacts on employers’ hiring assessments that copes with the issue of endogeneity. 
Third, we argue theoretically and show empirically that for a better understanding of the 
hiring process, the screening of applicants’ characteristics and the method through which 
applicants are recruited should be considered jointly, as this is how employers assess 
applications in real labor markets.  
By developing baseline counterfactuals for how applicants would be rated if not referred, we 
were able to capture the change in ratings that was due to a referral from one of employers’ 
business or professional contacts. By design, employers in our study were only informed 
about the presence (or not) of referrals and were not given any additional information about 
referred applicants (i.e. the mechanism of information advantages). Our findings suggest that 
simply knowing that an applicant has been referred is not sufficient; the informational 
advantages yielded from being referred seem to be necessary for employers to consider the 
benefit of recruiting informally. As shown elsewhere (e.g. Fernandez et al. 2000), employers 
value referrals for the additional information they bring about applicants’ hard-to-measure 
characteristics, such as work attitude, trainability, commitment. These characteristics were 
not included in our vignette design: thus, employers may have seen little benefit from 
preferring referrals over non-referrals, as the two were identical on all other observable 
characteristics. Nevertheless, if the characteristics being screened for are noisy signals (i.e. if 
education is not considered a signal of trainability), then our study shows that referred 
18 
 
applicants are more likely to be hired and are seen as more trainable than otherwise identical 
applicants who are not referred. This reinforces the argument made in the literature that, 
when formal educational qualifications are perceived as noisy signals, informal recruitment 
channels can represent a compensatory strategy for employers to deal with poor signaling 
(Marsden 2001).  
More generally, the referral effect is more noticeable at higher educational levels, as the fact 
of being referred when holding a master-degree may be seen by employers as some form of 
guarantee that these overeducated applicants will not leave their organization for jobs that 
better match their level of education. On the other hand, non-tertiary applicants are even 
´punished´ when referred, by being rated negatively by the employers. This has likely to do 
with employers´ suspicion and distrust arising when realizing that applicants of lower levels 
of education than expected were referred to them.  
Other authors have proposed that for jobs with very technical requirements, such as the ones 
under study in this paper, informal recruitment channels may be superfluous, as formal 
credentials already provide specific information about applicants’ knowledge and skills (Lin 
1999). However, according to our study, this observation should be further qualified. When 
formal education does not provide, in and of itself, clear signals to employers, interpersonal 
ties are relied upon to provide more credible information than what is conveyed through 
poorly understood qualifications. In this study, we have found preliminary evidence for the 
claim that social contacts can correct for poor signaling: as previously noted by Miller and 
Rosenbaum (1997: 517), “employers must not only receive information but receive it in the 
context of a social infrastructure that reassures them of its trustworthiness and relevance”.  
Our study does not come without limitations. We are aware of the small size of our sample, 
which may explain the non-significance of some of the regression coefficients, and 
admittedly limits the generalizability of our findings. In future research, we plan to test the 
referral effect with a larger sample, using population-based survey experiments (Mutz 2011). 
Also, data were gathered as part of a larger project, and various choices were constrained by 
the setup of a hiring simulation originally designed for other purposes. We are reassured by 
the fact that order effects, priming, or social desirability bias, if present, would indicate that 
our estimates of referral effects are on the conservative side. Future studies could be designed 
from the start with the aim to isolate the various mechanisms. For instance, the possibility to 
vary the quantity and quality of information about referred applicants would allow for a 
proper test of the mechanism of informational advantages, which we had to rule out by 
design. Similarly, future research could explore whether referral effects vary depending on 
the contact making the referral and the strength of her relationship with the employer.  
Our study has important policy implications. Researchers and policy-makers alike regularly 
voice concerns about the failure of the British education system to prepare students for 
specific occupations, especially if compared to countries like Germany or the Netherlands, 
where vocational schools are better attuned to labor market needs. Our findings support the 
idea that in contexts with noisy signals, school leavers entering their first job may benefit 
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from interpersonal ties with business and professional contacts of their prospective 
employers. However, employers’ decisions to recruit informally are not randomly distributed, 
nor are referrals from business and professional contacts. Future studies should consider more 
closely the motives that underlie employers’ preferences for informal recruitment channels, 
and the factors associated with such choice (e.g. Mencken and Winfield 1998, Gërxhani et al. 
2013, Gërxhani and Koster forthcoming). Given the social inequalities that may arise due to 
unequal access to networks, it would be better if these ties were to be transformed into 
institutionalized pathways of interaction between schools and employers (Brinton and Kariya 
1998, Rosenbaum et al. 1990). Increasing collaborations between schools and employers may 
significantly contribute to youth’s employment opportunities: for instance, by taking part in 
sandwich degree placements students build a network of professional contacts and potential 
referrers that may prove useful in gaining access to jobs (Purcell et al. 2002).  
Finally, our study focused on England, a country in which the education system does not give 
employers specific information about job applicants. One could argue that in England the less 
strict legislation on dismissals allows employers to correct for bad matches at a relatively low 
cost (Breen 2005) and should reduce their concerns at the hiring stage even in the absence of 
referrals (thus reducing the difference in ratings). We do not know, however, whether the 
same considerations would be applicable in countries characterized by different institutional 
arrangements (e.g. Germany or the Netherlands, where educational signaling is high). This 
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Table 1. Characteristics of respondents and their organizations. 
 
  Characteristics of employers 
 % Freq. 
Gender   
     Male 54.55 12 
     Female 45.45 10 
Educational background   
     Non tertiary 5.56 1 
     Tertiary, university 88.89 20 
     Tertiary, polytechnics  5.56 1 
Age   
     25-34 54.57 12 
     35-44 27.29 6 
     45-54 13.65 3 
     55 or more 4.55 1 
Experience in personnel selection   
     <2 years 9.09 2 
     3-5 years 27.27 6 
     6-10 years 36.36 8 
     >10 years 27.27 6 
Views about signaling role of education    
    Education signals trainability 40.91 9 
    Education signals fit with corporate                     9.09 2 
    environment   
  Characteristics of organizations 
 % Freq. 
Sector   
     Public 9.09 2 
     Private 40.91 9 
     Both 50.00 11 
Size (n. employees) % resp % target Freq. resp Freq. target 
     Small (from 10 to 49 employees) 31.82 22.67 7 39 
     Medium (from 50 to 249 employees) 13.64 23.25 3 40 
     Large (more than 250 employees) 54.55 54.07 12 93 
Regularly recruit via referrals from 
business or professional contacts   
     Yes  77.27 17 
     No 22.72 5 
   
 
Note: N total employers = 22. For the variable ‘organization size’, we also provide information about 
organizations that were targeted but did not participate in our survey, to compare the size of the organizations in 
our sample with the size of the organizations in the target population, which also takes into account non-




Table 2. Characteristics of (referred) applicants. 
 
 Vignette characteristics  % Freq. 
   
Gender   
     Male 56.36 62 
     Female 43.64 48 
Level of education   
     Non tertiary 26.36 29 
     Tertiary, bachelor 30.91 34 
     Tertiary, master 42.73 47 
Field of study   
     Informatics 24.55 27 
     Economics 35.45 39 
     Social Science 40.00 44 
Study duration   
     On time 36.36 40 
     Two-year delay 35.45 39 
     Early drop-out 28.18 31 
Grade point average   
     Fair 51.82 57 
     Very good 48.18 53 
Extra-curricular activities   
     Yes 51.82 57 
     No 48.18 53 
Previous work experience   
     Yes 53.64 59 
     No 46.36 51 
Internship at the firm   
     Yes 56.36 62 






Ratings (square root) Mean SD Min Max 
    Likelihood to hire the applicant 5.099 2.270 0 9.798 
    Likelihood that the applicant would be easy to train, if hired 5.485 2.333 1 9.950 
    Likelihood that the applicant would fit well with the corporate 5.658 2.254 1 9.644 
    culture of the organization 
     
 





Table 3. The role of referrals on employers’ ratings: linear regression models with employer fixed effects.  
 
Panel 1 
Likelihood to hire the applicant 
Panel 2 
Easy to train,  
if hired 
Panel 3 
Fit with corporate culture, 
if hired 
 M1 M2T M2F M3 M1 M2 M1 M2 
Referral 0.192 0.444** 0.170 -0.536 0.262* 0.516*** 0.178 0.241 
 (0.171) (0.222) (0.180) (0.326) (0.148) (0.191) (0.157) (0.164) 
Level of education (ref. non tertiary)         
   Bachelor    -0.105     
     (0.335)     
   Master    0.098     
    (0.314)     
Referral* education signaling         
   Referral*signal of trainability  -0.616*    -0.620**   
  (0.347)    (0.298)   
   Referral*signal of fit   0.240     -0.689 
   (0.598)     (0.545) 
Referral*level of education  
(ref. non-tertiary)   
      
   Referral*Bachelor    0.884**     
    (0.443)     
   Referral*Master    1.064**     
    (0.414)     
         
Constant 5.003*** 5.003*** 5.003*** 4.994*** 5.354*** 5.354*** 5.568*** 5.568*** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.243) (0.104) (0.104) (0.111) (0.111) 
N vignettes 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
N employers 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Employer fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 




Table 4. Indirect test of order effects: comparison of ratings for non-referred applicants.  
 
 Likelihood to hire 
the applicant 
Easy to train, if 
hired 
Fit with corporate 
culture, if hired 







Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  























Appendix A.  
Table A1. Factorial survey design. 
Vignette dimensions Vignette levels 
1. Gender 1. Male 
2. Female 
2. Previous work experience 1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Internship at the firm 1. Yes 
2. No 
4. Level of education 1. A-level 
2. University bachelor 
3. University master 
5. Field of study 1. Informatics 
2. Economics 
3. Social sciences 
6. Study duration 1. Graduated on time 
2. Graduated with a 2 year-delay 
3. Did not obtain a degree 
7. Grade point average 1. Fair (C) 
2. Very good (A) 
8. Extra-curricular activities 
 
1. Board member of a student committee 
2. None 
 
Note: Each vignette contained information on the vignette dimensions reported above. Vignettes were composed 
by randomly combining the above vignette levels. After crossing the vignette levels in all possible combinations 
(full factorial), a universe of all possible vignettes was created from which random samples of 18 vignettes were 
drawn without replacement and assigned to employers. Sub-samples of five vignettes were rated twice by each 
















Appendix B: Instructions given to respondents. 
 
You will now take part in the simulation of a selection process. Please indicate the job position you 
are most familiar with (i.e. the position for which you have selected the highest number of candidates 
or the position that is available in your organization):  
[ ] software engineer 
[ ] IT business consultant 
 
Imagine you are required to hire a junior (job indicated above) for your organization. Please read the 
following job description carefully (one of the following job descriptions is shown). 
Software Engineer 
Work in a team on the design, development 
and maintenance of software applications and 
operating systems, translating clients’ 
problems into customised and innovative 
technical solutions. Solve software-related 
issues in accordance with the demands of 
clients, including further maintenance and 
support of the software at the client’s site. 
Report to the project leader on an on-going 
basis. Discuss functional requirements and 
update existing documentation for clients and 
suppliers. 
IT Business Consultant  
Work at the interface between Business and 
IT and show a thorough understanding of 
business processes. Analyse business 
processes together with clients, identify 
specific needs and translate these into 
feasible, innovative technical solutions. Give 
clients advice on complex issues including 
enterprise content management, business 
intelligence and custom systems 
development. 
 
Screening of résumés: 
 
In a moment you will compare résumés of candidates who have applied for a job as (job indicated 
above). In each résumé, demographic characteristics, educational background, job history, and extra-
curricular activities of the candidates are listed. You can find a more detailed description by moving 
the cursor over the résumé. Please indicate for each résumé the likelihood that you would hire the 
candidate. 
 






Invitation to a job interview: 
 
Your screening of résumés generated the following shortlist of five candidates. Please rank these 
candidates in order of preference with regard to who you would invite to a job interview. Assign 1 to 
the candidate you would invite first, 2 to your second-best choice, and so on until 5. 
 
(First ranking task: employers rank the five shortlisted profiles) 
 
 
Job interview and job offer: 
 
Additional information about each candidate became available during the job interview. Please 
consider the new information at the bottom of each résumé and again compare the candidates with 
one another. You can find a more detailed description by moving the cursor over the résumé. 
 
In light of the information received, please re-rank the candidates according to the likelihood that you 
would hire them. Assign 1 to the candidate that you would prefer to hire, 2 to the second best, and so 
on until 5. 
 
(Second ranking task: employers re-rank the five shortlisted candidates after receiving additional 





Unfortunately, the five shortlisted candidates are no longer available, as they have found other jobs in 
the meantime. Consider a set of five new job candidates, who have been recruited informally through 
your network of professional and business contacts. 
 
(Second rating task: five profiles, identical to the ones already rated in the first rating task, are shown 
to employers). 
 
